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Abstract: The debate on the regulation of Next General Access started in Europe several 
years ago. It addresses the question of whether or not fibre access networks should be 
subject to the same regulation as the copper local loop. This debate is often examined as 
competition vs. investment. The present paper suggests that the best way for regulation to 
solve the dilemma is to promote competition through competitive investments in the fibre 
access market. In particular a combination of individual and co-investment from/among 
competing fibre operators could provide the desired outcome in terms of efficient 
investment, coverage, competition, innovation and prices/cost. Such an option 
corresponds to the choice of several European national regulators. It is also the the 
historical and highly successful option used in European mobile markets. 
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he debate regarding the regulation of Next General Access started 
several years ago in Europe. It addresses the question of whether or 
not fibre access networks, scheduled to replace copper pairs in fixed 
local loops to allow the continuation of traffic growth, should be under the 
same regulation as the copper local loop. In particular, should the mandatory 
unbundling of fibre local loops at cost oriented prices be imposed to fibre 
operators by Regulatory Authorities? 
The debate on this question at the European level has gone through 
several stages. In 2007, there was a consultation on NGA regulation by the 
European Regulatory Group and adoption by the European Commission 
(EC) of the Recommendation on Relevant Markets. In 2008, consultation on 
the first draft EC Recommendation on NGA regulation and at the same time, 
legislative debate regarding NGA regulation in the European Parliament and 
Council in the context of the Review of the electronic communications 
package. In 2009, there was a new consultation on a second draft EC 
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Recommendation on NGA regulation, quite different from the first one, and 
the conclusion of the legislative debate with the adoption of the Review of 
the Framework in December 2009. At the same time as this present paper is 
being drafted, a third version of the EC Recommendation is currently under 
discussion.  
Nevertheless, the outcome of this intense European regulatory activity in 
terms of fibre investment incentives appears limited. Milestones are the 
explicit inclusion of fibre local loops in the European Recommendation on 
Relevant Markets in 2007, and also provisions for NGA rollout in the Review 
of the European Framework adopted in 2009, notably investment in modern 
infrastructure defined as a policy objective, and acknowledgement of 
symmetrical access remedies or risk-sharing access contracts as relevant 
regulatory tools. In the meantime, relevant decisions have been taken by 
National Regulatory Authorities concerning the regulation of their domestic   
access markets.  However, the deadlock of the European regulatory debate 
is currently mirrored in the very limited deployment of fibre in Europe, and an 
ever-increasing gap as compared with Asia and the United States of 
America. The main reason for this situation may be that Europe is trying to 
find an impossible regulatory formula: 
•  If regulation imposes a fully non-discriminatory access regime to fibre 
investments, it means that non-investors have exactly the same rights to use 
fibre investments as investors, and benefit from exactly the same technical 
and economical conditions. In which case investing, as opposed to not 
investing, will provide no advantage to investors.  
•  Yet, potential fibre investors will only invest if they are convinced that 
investing will lead them to a more profitable situation than not investing. 
Therefore investment can only take place if it garantees an advantage and 
motivates investors to invest. 
Unconditional application of these contradictory principles may not 
provide a practical regulatory solution. On the contrary, the necessity of 
trade-offs between conflicting objectives has to be acknowledged. National 
regulation should strike a balance between objectives and in order to do so, 
should/needs to take into account the actual market situation and the 
priorities of their development. 
The NGA regulatory debate is often examined as competition vs. 
investment in the fibre access market. The purpose of the present paper is 
to suggest that the best way for the regulatory framework to solve this 
dilemma is to promote competition through competitive investments in M. LEBOURGES  47 
the fibre access market. In particular, a combination of individual and co-
investment among competing fibre operators could provide the desired 
outcome in terms of efficient investment, coverage, competition, innovation 
and prices. Such an option corresponds to the choice of several National 
Regulatory Authorities such as ARCEP in France or Anacom in Portugal 1. It 
was adopted with a high success rate in the European mobile markets. It is 
also the standard situation in a great majority of technological industries all 
over the world. The fibre-investment cycle appears as a unique opportunity 
in decades to definitively transform electronic communications into a 
modern, mature and competitive industry. This opportunity should not be 
lost. 
The first section highlights the importance of dynamic-efficiency effects in 
electronic communication industries, supported by recent results in technical 
progress regarding information technology reported in economic literature 
and by more specific attention to the technical content of fibre rollout. This 
element is critical to accurately assess the likely performances of the major 
regulation and competition scenarios concerning FTTH rollout. It concludes 
that provided that non discriminatory access to legacy bottlenecks is 
guaranteed, the most efficient solution, in terms of outcomes for the market, 
will combine infrastructure competition between vertically integrated fibre 
operators for the feeder portion of FTTH networks, and symmetrical access 
via risk sharing or co-investment contracts between fibre operators for the 
terminating segment of FTTH networks. 
In the second section, we explain why FTTH access areas, are either 
competitive, allowing several fibre operators to compete (black areas in the 
European Commission's terminology) or non-profitable even for a unique 
fibre operator (white areas in the European Commission's terminology). 
Areas for which a single fibre network would be profitable, but not several 
(grey areas in the European Commission's terminology) are necessarily a 
minor proportion of the access market and should not be the focus of the 
regulatory policy. Public funds should be dedicated to white areas and 
devoted to covering specific fixed costs in order to convert white areas into 
competitive areas. Finally, we suggest that a fibre market structure 
comprised of a few fibre access network operators is the appropriate 
structure to deliver innovation, large scale coverage and low prices which 
will lead to high penetration.  
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monopoly. 48     No. 78, 2
nd Q. 2010 
   Reaping the benefits of the effects  
of dynamic efficiency should be the priority  
of NGA regulatory policy 
Technological progress in information technology 
The works of Heebyung Koh, Christopher Magee and Mario Amaya of 
MIT assess technological progress in both information and energy 
technologies over the past 100-150 years. The technological progress of the 
former (from 20 to 30%) is much more important than for the latter (from 2 to 
7%), as illustrated in the figure below:  













Further analysis has shown that the annual rate of progress for the 
throughput of wireless technology reached 51% since the development of 
cellular service, i.e. for 30 years. This trend seems set to continue in the 
short and medium term. 
Obviously, these results are very general and do not directly apply to the 
specific case of fibre-access network rollouts. However, they substantiate 
the general message that dynamic effects are of paramount importance in 
information technology in general. Regulatory rules built on the research of 
pure static efficiency considerations and which ignore dynamic efficiency 
issues are prone to be substantially wrong. M. LEBOURGES  49 
If we analyse the potential impact of technical progress in fibre access 
rollout, the following elements should be taken into account: 
•  The large time-scale and the huge volumes needed for nation-wide 
fibre rollouts will allow learning curves and technological advances to impact 
the total cost of fibre access networks to a great degree, even though each 
piece of fibre access infrastructure may not be individually replaced before 
decades. 
•  Conventional wisdom mainly considers fibre rollout as a manpower 
activity, workers digging kilometres of trenches. This is not an accurate 
image, in particular where there is enough availability in existing ducts to 
accommodate fibre deployment, as it is the case in France. When ducts 
have been built for copper cables, available room for fibre cables in those 
ducts should not come as a surprise for anyone who has compared the very 
small diameter of fibre cables to the large diameter of copper cables. In 
France, statistics as well as experience have shown that, provided existing 
ducts are used efficiently, nearly no capacity investment in civil works will be 
needed. This may not be the case in all countries. For instance, there are no 
ducts in the Netherlands. In the UK, following the study by AnalysysMason 
for Ofcom, significant reinvestment in civil works appears to be needed for 
fibre, apparently due to the bad physical state of some portions of the 
infrastructure more than to the lack of available space. High technical 
progress in civil works itself is unlikely. However, technical progress may 
influence over time the quantity of civil works needed for a given length of 
fibre infrastructure. 
•  The exact nature of fibre investment expenses should be analysed in 
more detail for the sake of the regulatory debate. It will reveal that these 
expenses including, among other things, procurement of fibre cables, 
engineering studies, information system evolution and management, 
definition and control of rollout processes and the rollout itself, with its 
specific techniques. All these elements may benefit from technological 
progress all along the rollout process which may take between 10 to 20 
years. 
•  To check this, the existing level of technological progress in the rollout 
of classical fibre infrastructure for backbones or backhaul transmission 
should be considered. It will be seen that, although the volumes are very 
small compared to FTTH, and that the technology can be considered as 
mature, as backbone and backhaul fibre cables have been deployed for 
more than 25 years, there is still a significant evolution of the unit price of 
transmission fibre rollout per year. 50     No. 78, 2
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These elements indicate that more attention, both in terms of analysis 
and in terms of policy, should be paid to the dynamic efficiency potential in 
fibre access rollout, especially when under competitive pressure. 
Infrastructure competition and risk sharing through co-investment are 
the only models able to capture the dynamic efficiency effects which 
are critical for FTTH success 
This section is meant to compare different FTTH investment and 
competition models, regarding their scores in terms of product innovation, 
process innovation, coverage, consumer prices and choices. 
Options for investment and competition in FTTH networks  
The different options regarding FTTH investment and competition models 
are infinite. However, from the current regulatory debate, it is possible to 
characterise 5 major options: 
- (1)  Competitive  private investments. 
-  (2) Private investments by a single undertaking with risk-sharing or co-
investment access contracts for competitors. 
-  (3) Complementary private investments with voluntary reciprocal 
access between competitors. 
-  (4) Private investments by a single undertaking with traditional, 
unconditional price per access for competitors. 
-  (5) Separation of the access activity (utility model). 
Options (2) and (3), described above, are relatively close/similar and may 
sometimes coincide in practice: voluntary reciprocal access may be 
proposed under risk sharing conditions, whereas private investment by a 
single undertaking may concern only a proportion of areas, other areas 
being covered by another undertaking. 
A single option may not be optimal for all geographical areas, and in each 
geographical area a single option may not be optimal for all elements of the 
fibre access network. For instance, it is commonly acknowledged that 
infrastructure competition within/inside buildings is not a reasonable option. 
In France, the regulation defined by ARCEP imposes a unique terminating 
segment, from the so-called "point de mutualisation" (mutualisation point) to 
the subscriber's premises. In very dense areas and for buildings with twelve 
homes or more, ARCEP considers that the mutualisation point may be M. LEBOURGES  51 
located in the building. Outside very dense areas or for buildings with fewer 
than 12 homes, ARCEP considers that the mutualisation point should be 
located outside buildings and serve a reasonable number of buildings. The 
precise definition of what is a reasonable number of buildings, is still under 
examination at this point in time. The different versions of the draft 
Recommendations of the EC on NGA regulation also refer to the concept of 
terminating segment of the fibre local loop, as opposed to the feeder part: 
the terminating segment goes from the "Distribution Point" in the EC 
terminology to the subscribers' premises, and the feeder part goes from the 
first optical network node to the "Distribution Point". 
Features to evaluate the five options 
The features which characterise the different options, and which will 
serve as criteria to score the global performance of each option, can be 
summarised as follows: 
-  static cost efficiency, for a given technology: the static extra cost of 
duplication compared to mutualisation; 
-  dynamic cost efficiency, related to process innovation: the capacity of 
the option to enhance faster learning curves for operational and rollout 
costs, and higher technical progress to minimise cable and equipment 
costs; 
-  incentive for extending the geographical coverage: are operators in a 
process which maximises their incentive to extend their geographical 
coverage, or are they better off concentrating on the densest zones? 
-  demand oriented retail prices: have operators' enough freedom to 
adapt their price structures in order to meet the heterogeneous customer 
demand, or on the contrary, are they submitted to rigid constraints 
leading to "one size fits all" prices on the retail market? 
-  product and service innovation: do operators have a full end-to-end 
control of their technical chain and are therefore able to freely introduce 
product innovation for their customers, or, on the contrary, are their 
innovation processes impeded by slow multilateral administrative 
decision processes and minimal scope, if any, for service differentiation? 
-  incentive for achieving high market penetration: is the business model 
of retail operators based on de facto variable infrastructure costs, 
favouring low volumes and high margin or is the business model of retail 
operators based on de facto high fixed infrastructure costs and low 
variable infrastructure costs, favouring high penetration? 
-  low network entry barriers: is regulation optimised to favour network 
entry? 52     No. 78, 2
nd Q. 2010 
-  low service entry barriers: is regulation optimised to favour service 
entry? 
Static versus dynamic cost effects: a toy example 
Before analysing how each of the 5 competition and investment options 
score in relation to the different aforementioned criteria, it is useful to take 
some time to elaborate on dynamic efficiency effects. In the previous 
section, the potential level of dynamic efficiency effects on fibre access 
rollout has also been emphasized. Dynamic efficiency effects, even without 
taking into account the long term issues of innovation and sustainable 
competition, may not be marginal when compared to static efficiency effects, 
regarding the overall cost of fibre rollout. 
This can be illustrated with a toy example, comparing purely on a cost-
basis, a single monopoly network versus two competing networks to serve 
the same demand. 
This toy example is not meant to prove that dynamic efficiency effects 
always dominate static efficiency effects, but that the former cannot a priori 
be assumed to be negligible compared to the latter and that therefore both 
have to be considered for regulatory policy purposes: 
•  There have been numerous technico-economic studies on fibre 
access networks (Wik, AnalysysMason, IDATE, …) but all are based on a 
large number of ad hoc hypotheses and parameters. No generic studies give 
a robust and simple estimate of static efficiency loss when two fibre access 
networks are built instead of one. For the purpose of the present toy 
example, we will assume that two competing access networks have a static 
cost 50% higher than a single network: 50% being the average between the 
minimum extra cost, 0%, and the maximum extra cost 100%. 
•  The competitive pressure on network rollout activities may generate 
an additional minus 5% to 10% per year on learning curve and technical 
progress. This appears to be a conservative figure when considering the 
general level of technological progress in information technology, and also 
the specific level of technical progress already observed in classical fibre 
infrastructure rollout. 
•  Under such a hypothesis, the total cost of rolling-out two networks 
may prove to be lower than the total cost of rolling out one network, as 
illustrated in the depictive graph below, where the total cost in each case is 
the integral surface below each curve: M. LEBOURGES  53 
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Existing quantitative studies about regulation and competition in fibre 
access have taken the implicit hypothesis that the fibre access cost function 
does not depend on whether or not fibre access is provided under monopoly 
or under competition. This is a bold hypothesis. It is in contradiction with the 
philosophy of European electronic communication regulation which 
considers competition as a powerful means to enhance efficiency. Cost 
studies on fibre-access networks comparing monopoly and competitive fibre 
access rollouts should take into account the benefit of competition in fibre 
rollout on the productivity of undertakings. 
Approach for an evaluation of the investment and competition models 
This paragraph analyses through a representative set of examples, how 
the 5 FTTH competition and investment options proposed above (p. 6). May 
be rated against the different features which have been defined above: static 
and dynamic cost efficiency, incentive for extending the geographical 
coverage, demand-oriented retail prices, product and service innovation, 
incentive for achieving high market penetration, low network or service entry 
barriers. 54     No. 78, 2
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For instance, concerning the criterion "Low service entry barriers", the 
best option is a standard access obligation because there is no need to pay 
fixed or upfront-costs to enter the market. Also, the access infrastructure and 
products, as they have been defined by using information from the retail 
market are technically specified to be relevant to feed the retail market, 
thanks to the vertical integration of the access provider. The level of 
adaptation from the infrastructure to the needs of the retail market with the 
option "pure access activity" will not be as good and therefore it is ranked 
second. The third best option is the "risk sharing contract", which still allows 
an undertaking to enter the market without physically investing, but with a 
commitment of the access beneficiaries towards the access provider. The 
last two options do not allow market entry without investment. The fourth 
option is investing only in a geographical sector of the market for the 
"reciprocal access agreement". The fifth option is the "infrastructure 
competition" wherein the investment must address the defined market in its 
entirety. 
If the example of the criterion "low network entry barrier" is considered 
instead of "low service entry barriers", then "infrastructure competition" 
appears to be first, because under these options, network rollout is given 
maximum facility and efficiency. 
Infrastructure competition logically has the best ranking for all features, 
except static cost efficiency and low service entry barrier, for which it has the 
worst rankings. 
The cost structure of the undertakings operating on the retail market, 
particularly regarding their fixed and variable costs has a particular impact 
on their incentive to have a large number of customers and favour a high 
and fast penetration of the service. With high fixed costs and low variable 
costs, there is a strong incentive to reach high penetration. On the contrary, 
with no fixed cost and high variable costs, the incentive is to have high retail 
prices on top of high variable costs, and service penetration is not a critical 
issue. In this respect, reciprocal access agreements and risk sharing 
contracts have similar cost characteristics as infrastructure competition: fixed 
cost as a counterpart of reduced variable cost. All three options give 
incentive to favour service penetration. 
Risk sharing contracts, when compared to infrastructure competition, 
benefit from static cost efficiency but lose dynamic cost efficiency effects. 
Reciprocal access agreements, retain some of the dynamic efficiency of 
infrastructure competition, as several undertakings are rolling-out there own M. LEBOURGES  55 
network. Reciprocal access agreements also benefit from static efficiency. 
However, reciprocal access agreements may not reach the same level of 
dynamic efficiency as pure infrastructure competition because this option 
needs strong technical and economical coordination between undertakings. 
All undertakings need to make compromises, adopt some form of second 
best solutions and cannot freely innovate in the portions of infrastructure 
which are under reciprocal access agreement. In-building fibre infrastructure 
in France illustrates this point quite well: even though there has always been 
a general agreement between the regulator and undertakings on reciprocal 
access, an operational agreement may just now be reached after more than 
3 years of discussions. This proves that coordination and transaction costs 
are not just theoretical ideas but are also deeply felt in the real world.  
By contrast, as far as retail pricing is concerned, the two options 
"standard access obligation" and "pure access activity" both have a very 
important drawback: they artificially transform actual fixed costs into 
apparent variable costs at the borderline of the access activity. This bias 
leads to overall poor pricing and investment decisions. In particular, it makes 
it impossible to apply efficient penetration and value pricing strategies. This 
severely limits the value which can be extracted from the market, and 
therefore decreases the incentive to extend the investment. It also severely 
limits the possibility to adapt prices to customer's willingness to pay, in 
particular for low value customers, and puts service penetration at a risk. 
This explains why they are poorly ranked on penetration and demand 
associated features. 
Let's now more specifically consider the pure access activity option. 
Technically it will be a monopoly, and so it will not benefit from any 
competitive pressure to reduce costs. It will face hard coordination and 
conflicts of interest, related to investment and prices, between downstream 
and upstream. It will ignore information and incentives from the retail market 
and may take ill-informed decisions. Competing downstream undertakings 
which use purely upstream access activities will moreover have 
contradictory demands concerning investments, processes, coverage, 
technologies, interfaces and prices of the upstream monopoly. The only way 
to solve these contradictions may be either from the upstream monopoly to 
break non discrimination and favour one downstream operator, or from the 
downstream competitors to make agreements that risk not being fully 
compliant with article 101 of the Treaty. 
Coverage will of course be better guaranteed with high dynamic 
efficiency and competitiveness among fibre operators to reach customers by 56     No. 78, 2
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extending their networks. On the contrary, of course, pure access activity or 
standard access obligation options mean no pressure for technical efficiency 
nor competitive incentive for coverage, rigid retail pricing and therefore low 
coverage. 
Basic comparison of the investment  
and competition model regarding all criteria 
All these considerations are summarised in the table below. Each figure 
in the table is meant to rank the different competition and investment options 
regarding the different features being considered. Then rankings have been 
added on all features in order to identify the best overall options. Figures 
given in the table are rankings: lowest figures correspond to best options; 
highest figures correspond to the worst options. 
On a scale of one to five, the sum of the rankings is 15, which is written 
on the bottom line of the table. The rankings have been written in such a 
way that all considered features have the same total weight of 15, even in 
the cases where several investment options appear to be fairly equal 
regarding a feature and therefore have the same ranking in the table. 
As illustrated in the chart below, in order from highest to lowest the global 
ranking is: infrastructure competition, risk sharing pricing, reciprocal access 
agreements, standard access obligations and pure access activity. 































511 1 1 1 15 1 6 Best
Risk sharing contract 2,5 3 3 2,5 2 2,5 2,5 3 21 2nd
Vol complement invest + 
reciprocal access
2,5 2 2 2,5 3,5 2,5 4 4 23 3rd
Standard access 
obligation
2,5 4 4,5 4 3,5 4,5 2,5 1 26,5 4th
Pure access separated 
activity
2,5 5 4,5 5 5 4,5 5 2 33,5 Worst
T o t a l 1 5 1 5 1 51 5 1 5 1 51 5 1 5
 
Obviously, if this evaluation model is used on a more practical basis, the 
different criteria should be weighted carefully, and will depend on the 
particular piece of investment concerned, on whether the investment takes 
place in dense or non dense areas, or on whether it takes place at the M. LEBOURGES  57 
beginning of the learning curve or later, when technologies and processes 
have reached a certain degree of maturity. For instance, in the case of FTTH 
in-building wiring in dense areas, and more generally in the case of FTTH 
terminating segment, as defined in EC draft NGA Recommendations, the 
total cost is so high, including the cost for the industry but also the 
transaction costs with all concerned stakeholders, such as landlords and 
local authorities, that static efficiency is a dominant concern. Therefore 
infrastructure competition is excluded in such a case. But the profitability of 
such an investment is highly dependant on fast market penetration and of 
demand oriented prices. Therefore risk-sharing or co-investment contracts or 
complementary investments with reciprocal access are the only efficient 
solutions this case. This is the option which has been chosen in France by 
ARCEP for in-building fibre in very dense areas. 
   Except for the terminating segment, FTTH infrastructure 
competition is a realistic option outside non profitable 
areas, and would lead to low prices, high coverage and 
strong innovation   
The first part of this paper has shown that whenever possible, outside the 
terminating segment, infrastructure competition should be chosen as an 
investment and competition model for FTTH. In this section, we will show 
that infrastructure competition is indeed economically sustainable except in 
non profitable areas at least in France. The intermediate areas, where only a 
single FTTH network would be profitable, represents only a limited, less than 
12%, and unstable proportion of the market. 
If regulation allows FTTH infrastructure competition to flourish, completed 
by risk sharing or co-investment access contracts for the terminating 
segment, the fibre market structure will become close to market structures 
observed in the European mobile industry, with between 3 to 5 infrastructure 
competitors delivering high investments, high coverage, high penetration, 
affordable prices and high innovation. 58     No. 78, 2
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In France, areas where an FTTH access network is a profitable natural 
monopoly, should represent 12% or less of the national access market. 
In European Competition Law terminology, they are known as "grey 
areas"  
A critical parameter for investment and competition in FTTH access 
networks is the number of parallel access networks which can be 
simultaneously profitable in a single local area. 
In this regard, the recent guidelines for State Aids for Broadband and 
NGA coverage Law 2 define three categories of areas: 
-  "black" areas, where at least two parallel access networks can coexist 
and be profitable at the same time and where there is, a priori, no market 
failure. The European State Aids guidelines text explicitly classifies as 
competitive areas where at least two competitive NGA infrastructures are 
deployed; whereas the second version of the EC draft Recommendation 
on NGA regulation tends to request three or even four parallel 
infrastructures for an area to be declared competitive. 
-  "grey" areas", where only a single network can be profitable  3 and 
where regulation is needed to compensate for the absence of 
infrastructure competition; however, regulation should be fine-tuned to 
keep investment incentives alive otherwise, regulation will turn "grey" 
areas into "white" areas, 
-  "white" areas, where even a single network would not be profitable 
and therefore no private investment can be expected. Public subsidies 
are necessary to obtain fibre coverage. 
"Black" areas and "white" areas are a common situation in a market 
economy and do not call for sector specific economic regulation: regulation 
by  ex post application of competition law for "black" areas, in particular 
article 101 against collusion and article 102 against abuse of dominant 
position, State Aid rules or Altmark criteria for Services of General Economic 
Interest for "white" areas. 
                       
2 See "Community Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid 
deployment of broadband networks", Consultation of the European Commission May-June 
2009, Indent (37). 
3 Or where only one, two or three infrastructures can coexist if we take the very demanding 
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The situation of "grey" areas is more original in a market economy and 
may require specific asymmetric rules applicable to the owner of the single 
infrastructure.  
From this stems the issue on whether or not commercial activities based 
on FTTH access networks may require a heavy-handed sector specific 
economic regulation, or, on the contrary, a light approach, depending on the 
proportion of "grey" areas, to "black" and "white" ones, in the total market. If 
"grey" areas represent a significant proportion of the total market, specific 
asymmetric regulation will play a major role in the regulation of FTTH 
services. If "grey" areas represent a small portion of the total market, then 
regulation should rely mostly on European Competition law.  
The developments below show that the boundaries of "grey" areas are 
structurally limited by self-consistency constraints concerning the conditions 
of profitability of a fibre access network.  
Applying these constraints to French local areas where FTTH networks 
are supposed to be installed, leads to the conclusion that "grey" areas 
represent a maximum of 12% of the total fibre access market. If black 
areas were defined by the presence of a minimum of three (resp. four) 
infrastructures, then grey areas would represent a maximum of 20% (resp. 
25%) of the total access network. Moreover, the precise identification of 
where these grey areas are critically depends on varying cost and demand 
parameters. 
Therefore in France, grey areas will represent a limited and unstable 
proportion of the market. Besides what is necessary to ensure non 
discriminatory network rollout cost conditions between FTTH operators, 
sector specific asymmetric regulation, which is only justified by the existence 
of "grey" areas, should therefore have a relatively limited weight to ex post 
competition law in the regulation of FTTH based services in France. 
The lower density limit of black areas corresponds to areas twice as dense as 
the higher density limit of white areas 
When calculating the potential profitability of an FTTH network, the most 
critical parameter to take into account is the household density per km² of 
the local area to be served. Of course, a detailed calculation of the 
profitability of a specific area would involve many other parameters, but for a 
global assessment of the profitability of FTTH networks in local areas, 
household density is the most critical. Therefore, we can characterise the 60     No. 78, 2
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borderline between "white" and "grey" where a single access network starts 
being profitable, by a threshold of density D households per km². Numerous 
studies on the cost of NGA networks as a function of households per km² or 
of specific geotypes by consultants such as Wik, AnalysysMason or IDATE, 
have been published. However, their results depend on a large number of 
parameters and hypothesis which are difficult to assess, each of which 
having a significant impact on the conclusion. For instance, Wik's study on 
NGA costs realised for ECTA and published in 2008, used for France the 
hypothesis that FTTH rollout would imply an investment in ducts for 20% of 
the infrastructure length. Such a hypothesis, which we now know to be 
inaccurate, predetermined to a large extend the conclusion of the study. 
The approach proposed in this paragraph is different: it does not try to 
evaluate the absolute value of FTTH rollout cost, but to characterise as 
simply and transparently as possible consistency relationships between the 
profitability of FTTH investments in different contexts. 
Let us assume that a local area will be profitable for a single FTTH 
network as soon as the household density is above D per km².  
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All other things being equal, if one FTTH access network may be 
profitable as soon as household density exceeds D customers per km², then 
two FTTH access networks may be profitable when household density 
exceeds 2.D per km². This is because, provided network operators are 
placed under non discriminatory conditions for network rollout and customer 
acquisition, each of the two operators may claim to have half the market on 
its network. Therefore each of the two networks benefit from a household 
density D per km² and per network, which is sufficient enough to be 
profitable: 
•  Concerning revenues, regulatory constraints which prohibit monopoly 
income allow the assumption that the average revenue per customer will be 
equivalent despite whether several networks serve the area or not. In an 
area of density 2D per km², 2 networks will therefore each have the 
equivalent revenue of a single network in an area of density D per km². 
•  Concerning costs, the total cost of two networks competing in an area 
of density 2D is, at most, twice the cost of a single network serving an area 
of density D. This is because, if the cost of an access network depends on 
customer density, which is the hypothesis suggested in the context 
presented in this study, building an access network in an area of density D 
costs C. If, in an area of density 2D, there are two identical networks each 
serving half of the total market, therefore each benefiting from a density D 
and if no costs are shared between the two networks, then each one will 
cost C and together they will cost 2C. Also, from a well-known propriety of 
concave functions, such as network cost as a function of density, if the 
market is not equally shared between the two networks, the total cost of the 
two networks will be lower than the total cost that would occur if the market 
was equally shared. 
Therefore, the profitability limit for two parallel networks corresponds to a 
density of 2.D households per km² or lower. For the sake of simplicity, we 
will consider in the following lines that this threshold of profitability is simply 
equal to 2.D, which overestimates the weight of grey areas, those where a 
single network is profitable and where two would not be profitable. Hence, 
there is a mathematical relation between on the one hand, the minimal 
household density which is the boundary between white and grey areas, and 
on the other hand, household density which is the boundary between black 
and grey areas. The latter is inferior or equal to twice the former.  Grey areas 
correspond to areas whose densities are between these two values. Using 
the actual concentration curve of lines in the French territory, and applying 
the mathematical relation described above, the interval between density D 
and density 2D represents 12% of the access line market: 62     No. 78, 2
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Proportion of lines in grey areas: around 12%*
* Whatever the proportion of black and white areas
 
The empirical concentration curve of access lines in France is accurately 
estimated by a logarithmic curve. Therefore, the proportion of lines between 
density 2D and density D equals 12%, whatever the value of D. 
Therefore if black areas are defined by the coexistence of two profitable 
networks, then grey areas, where a single network is profitable, represent 
12% of the access market in France. 
The above analysis about density 2D can also be applied with density 3D 
for three competing infrastructures (resp. 4D for four competing 
infrastructures). Using the same line concentration curve and using the 
same considerations, grey areas can be evaluated to represent 20% (25%) 
of the access market, if black areas need 3 (resp.4) competing networks. 
These estimations are without considering the benefits of infrastructure 
competition in terms of dynamic efficiency. 
This calculation only concerns the technical part of the access network. 
Other elements of the technical network, such as: backhaul, transport, 
service platforms, as well as the commercial network, correspond to larger 
geographical scales. Therefore, demand appears less geographically 
concentrated and the effect modelled here appears weaker. However, these 
elements are already known to be competitive in France, except for a 
proportion of the backhaul networks serving non dense local areas. It 
remains to be analysed how many "black FTTH" local areas for which the M. LEBOURGES  63 
backhaul market is not competitive there are. However it is unlikely that such 
case would modify the overall conclusion. 
Expressed in qualitative words: French local areas are small and very 
heterogeneous: from 100 000 inhabitants to 50 inhabitants for a " constant 
size of 45 km². Conditions for an FTTH local area to be grey are very 
restricted: dense enough for one network but not for two (resp. 3 or 4). When 
restricted conditions are applied to a very heterogeneous population of 
areas, it is logical that only a very limited number of areas meet these 
conditions. 
Grey areas represent a limited proportion of the FTTH access areas.   
Moreover, they represent a constantly changing target, as their precise 
locations depend on unpredictable demand and cost conditions. They should 
not be the focus of regulation (except level playing field conditions). 
Regulation should focus on facilitating infrastructure competition in black 
areas and the public coverage of the specific costs of white areas so that 
they can evolve into black areas. 
Competition between fibre access operators will lead to an efficient 
market structure, delivering low prices, high coverage and strong 
innovation 
If the recommendations discussed above are followed, the fibre market 
structure would probably lead to 3 to 5 fibre operators. Each of which will 
have its own fibre network in the feeder part of the access network down to a 
mutualisation point giving access to a unique terminating segment for all 
operators. Access to the terminating segment would be granted by the 
operator which has built it through risk sharing, co-investment conditions. 
Such a market structure resembles mobile market structures in Europe, 
which over the last 20 years have proved to be among the greatest 
European industrial, financial and commercial successes ever in information 
technology. 
In this final section, we will show why only such a market structure is 
likely to provide the desired outcome on investment, coverage, penetration, 
innovation and low prices for consumers. The objective here is not to argue 
that there is a precise analogy between fibre and mobile access cost 
structures, but to use the mobile historic example to show why a market 64     No. 78, 2
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structure made of a few infrastructure based competitors should deliver the 
desired outcome.  
Infrastructure competition market structures will lead to lower prices for 
consumers 
As shown in the first section technical progress in information technology 
in general and in information transportation in particular is very high. This 
technical progress will only benefit consumers if operators are able to 
continuously invest and incorporate the latest technologies into their 
networks. This implies a market structure which contemporaneously: 
-  allows the existence of adequate Ebitda margins in order to generate 
the necessary cash flows and favours rational, allocations of these cash 
flows to make network investments, 
-  requires undertakings to make these investments in order to remain 
competitive. 
An "imperfect" competition between a few competitors has precisely 
these characteristics and leads to lower prices for consumers than a 
perfectly competitive market. "Imperfect" competition (prices above cost) 
leads to lower prices than "perfect" competition (prices = costs) because 
costs are lower in the former case than in the latter. 
Infrastructure competition market structures will lead to large market 
driven geographical coverage, high service penetration and strong 
innovation.  
Concerning geographical coverage, facts along with common sense 
converge to conclude that a race for coverage between competing 
infrastructure operators leads to the fastest, cheapest and largest market 
driven coverage. Mobile coverage was faster than any other technology 
thanks to infrastructure competition. 
Concerning affordability and penetration, the results of the mobile model 
of infrastructure competition is crystal clear: by and large, mobile is the most 
affordable access to electronic communication world-wide. At the end of 
2010, around 5 billion people will use a mobile access, more than 80% of the 
world population. In Europe, the universal mobile access has been obtained 
without any universal service obligation. This result comes from mobile 
infrastructure competition, each operator willing to attract the maximum 
number of consumers on its own infrastructure.  Infrastructure competition 
has also allowed mobile operators to tailor more precisely their pricing M. LEBOURGES  65 
structure to the diversity of their customers' demand, thanks to the absence 
of cost oriented wholesale access obligations which would have led to 
uniform retail pricing. 
Infrastructure competition is also key in obtaining permanent product and 
service innovation thanks to the technical freedom enjoyed by competitive 
operators. 
These key success factors of European mobile markets derive from the 
initial choice of infrastructure based competition and would probably not 
have been achieved if more conservative regulatory options had been 
chosen by public authorities. 
   Conclusion  
The developments presented in this paper have shown that competition 
and investment in FTTH networks may be obtained through competition by 
investment as well as through symmetrical access obligations imposed to 
the terminating segment of FTTH network, under risk sharing or co 
investment contracts Such a competition and investment model would 
deliver fast and extended coverage, high penetration, low prices and strong 
innovation. 66     No. 78, 2
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